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murder of the first degree as defined in the above quoted 
section of the Penal Code. (People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 
[281 P. 609]; People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 P.2d 51].) 
For the foregoing reasons I would reduce the degree of 
the crime to that of murder of the second degree. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 
1957. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be gTanted. 
(L. A. No. 24129. In Bank. Apr. 12, 1957.] 
THE CI'rY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellant, v. BELRIDGE 
OIL COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Licenses-Power to License or Tax-Territorial Limitations.-
·where a business license tax sought to be collected is a 
privilege tax exacted for the privilege of engaging in the 
activity of "selling," and this activity takes place within the 
city, the rate of tax may be measured by the gross receipts 
attributable to selling activities within the city though some 
of them are attributable to extraterritorial elements, such as 
production and delivery of goods, since such selling activity 
can constitutionally be taxed by the city though the goods 
never enter its territorial limits. 
[2] !d.-Power to License or Tax-Territorial Limitations.-To 
allow a city to levy a license tax based on gross receipts at-
tributable to selling activities outside the city would be an 
unreasonable discrimination and a denial of equal protection 
of the law. 
[3] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construc-
tion.-\Vhere a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two con-
structions, one of which will render it constitutional and the 
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, the court will adopt 
the construction which, without doing violence to the reason-
able meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its 
entirety or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, though 
the other construction is equally reasonable. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Licenses, § 7 et seq.; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 7 
et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 61 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Constitutional Law, § 96 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Licenses, § 9; [3] Constitutional 
Law, § 48; ( 4] Licenses, § 35.5. 
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[4] Licenses-Amount of Tax-Method of Allocation.-Under a 
city ordinance imposing a tax on those engaged in selling 
goods, wares or merchandise within the city, where only that 
portion of the gross receipts directly attributable to an oil 
company's selling activities carried on in the city could be 
taxed and the parties stipulated that by a method of allocation 
"fairly calculated to determine [the company's] gross receipts" 
20 per cent thereof was derived from selling activities in the 
city, the trial court correctly applied the tax formula to 20 
per cent of such company's gross receipts. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph IN. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover license taxes. Judgment for defendant 
affirmed. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Bourke Jones and James 
A. Doherty, Assistant City Attorneys, for Appellant. 
Wellborn, Barrett & Rodi, Vernon Barrett and F. C. 
Lowell Head for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-'l'his is an appeal by the city of Los Angeles 
from a judgment entered upon a retrial after a decision by 
this court (City of Los Angeles v. Belridge OiL Co., 42 Cal.2d 
823 [271 P.2d 5]) reversing a judgment in favor of de-
fendant, Belridge Oil Company. 
The only question involved here is whether the trial court 
properly applied the law as set forth in our decision* on the 
prior appeal. 
Upon the retrial the parties stipulated that all of the gross 
receipts of the defendant ''are attributable in part to its 
selling activities within the City of Los Angeles and in part 
to its selling activities without the City'' and that ''not more 
than 20% of defendant's total gross receipts for the years 
1948 and 1949 are attributable to defendant's business [or 
selling activities] in the City of Los Angeles under any 
method of allocation which is fairly calculated to determine the 
defendant's gross receipts derived from or attributable to 
sources within the City of l;os Angeles and to determine the 
defendant's gross receipts derived from or attributable to 
sources outside the City of Los Angeles" subject to plaintiff 
*The facts are fully set forth therein. 
48 C.2d-ll 
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city's right to maintain on that there should be no 
allocation of for the purpose of determining the 
amount of th(~ tax and that the tax should be measured by 
defendant's total gro:,;s receipts. Defendant agreed that 20 
per cent of its total gross receipts for the years 1948 and 
1949 might be used to measure the tax to be imposed upon 
it under section 21.166 of plaintiff's license ordinance for the 
years 1949 and 1950. 
'l'he trial court held, in accord with the stipulations entered 
into between the parties, that defendant was subject to the 
liL•ense tax ( § 21.166) for such portion of its gross receipts 
''as is derived from or attributable to its business or selling 
activities in the City of lJos Angeles; that such portion of 
such gross receipts should be determined under some method 
of allocation which is fairly calculated to determine the de-
fendant's gross receipts derived from or attributable to sources 
within the City of Los Angeles and to determine the de-
fendant's gross receipts derived from or attributable to 
sources outside the City of Los Angeles." And that "Not 
more than 20% of defendant's total gross receipts for the 
years 1948 and 1949 are derived from or attributable to de-
fendant's business in the city of Los Angeles.'' And that 
"Not more than 20% of defendant's total gross receipts for 
the years 1948 and 1949 are derived from or attributable to 
defendant's selling activities in the City of Los Angeles." 
In harmony with its conclusion, the trial court held that 
there remained due and owing to the plaintiff from the de-
fendant the sum of $536.43, including both principal and 
interest. 
The primary argument of the plaintiff is that this court 
did not, in its prior opinion, hold that there should be an 
allocation of the total gross receipts of defendant based upon 
the selling activities directly attributable to the Los Angeles 
part of defendant's business. 
Section 21.166 of the Los Angeles City Tax Ordinance pro-
vides that "Every person manufacturing and selling any 
goods, wares or merchandise at wholesale, or selling goods, 
wares, or merchandise at wholesale, and not otherwise specifi-
cally licensed by other provisions of this Article, shall pay for 
each calendar year, or portion thereof, the sum of $8.00 for 
the first $20,000, or less, of gross receipts, and, in addition. 
" We held (p. 830) that "defendant's Los Angeles 
offiee was engaged in the activity of 'selling goods, wares or 
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merchandise at wholesale' within the city of Los Angeles and 
was therefore subject to the provisions of section 21.166 of 
the r~os Angeles tax ordinance.'' We also specifically held 
(pp. 831, 832) that "There is, however, one important limi-
tation which should be pointed out and that is this: even 
though the can tax the activity of selling it can only 
base the tax on such selling activities as are carried out within 
its territorial limits. For this reason it is only those gross 
receipts which are attributable to selling activities within 
the city which should form the basis for the rate of tax. Gross 
receipts attributable to selling activities conducted outside the 
city should not be ineluded. Such a construction necessarily 
follows from the fact that the business license tax is on the 
privilege of en gaging in selling activities in the city of Los 
Angeles and as such should only be based on such activities.'' 
[1] Plaintiff argues that the controversy centers around 
the statement made by this court (p. 831) that "Defendant 
company also contends that even if section 21.166 is applicable, 
the city cannot eonstitutionally tax the total gross receipts 
of the company since such would be an attempt to impose a 
tax on business carried on outside the city. This argument 
is based on the ground that since the total gross receipts in-
clude the proceeds of products produced and delivered out-
side the city the effect would be to allow a city to tax trans-
actions occurring outside its boundaries. This argument seems 
to lose sight of the nature of section 21.166." This state-
ment \ms directed at defendant's argument that some of its 
gross receipts were attributable to extraterritorial elements 
such as the production and delivery of the goods. \Ve held that 
there \vas no constitutional objection to resorting to extra-
territorial elements in determining the rate of tax (Great 
Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Gros.iean, 301 U.S. 412 [57 S.Ct. 
772, 81 LEd. 1193, 112 A.I.1.R. 293] ; <Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 
TT.S. 525 [40 S.Ot. 2, 63 I_.1.Ed. 1124]; Cedar Hills Cemetery 
Corp. v. Dish·ict of Columbia, 124 F.2d 286). We concluded 
that "']'he activity being taxed here is the activity of selling 
ancl !'Inch activity can be taxed by the city even though the 
goods 11evrr enter its territorial limits. (Keystone Metal Co. 
v. T'illslmroh, supm, 874 Pa. 828 r97 A.2d 7971.)" 
[2] Plaint.ifr <H"g'tti>c; that the requil'<'liWllis of Clue process 
and t•qnal pr·ott•dion do not (•ompel an apportionment of re-
('t>ipts aitrihuiable io the husirwss earried on within the city. 
'rhis argument was answered adversely to plaintiff in our 
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opinion on the prior appeal where we held that ''To allow a 
city to levy a license tax based upon gross receipts attributable 
to selling activities outside the city would be an unreason-
able discrimination and a denial of equal protection of the 
law. (See Ferran v. City of Pa~o Alto, 50 Cal.App.2d 374 
[122 P.2d 965].) If such taxation were allowed it would un-
justly discriminate against those firms whose selling activ-
ities in Los Angeles compose but a small fraction of the 
total sales effort and whose gross receipts are in large part 
attributable to selling activities in other areas. [3] As stated 
in Franklin v. Petm"son, 87 Cal.App.2d 727, 730 [197 P.2d 
788], 'It is the rule that where a statute or ordinance is sus-
ceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it 
constitutional and the other unconstitutional, in whole or in 
part, the court will adopt the construction which, without 
doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, 
will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to 
its constitutionality, even though the other construction is 
equally reasonable. The rule is based on the presumption 
that the legislative body intended not to violate the Constitu-
tion, but to make a valid statute or ordinance within the scope 
of its constitutonal powers.' In the instant case a just and 
reasonable construction requires that the measure of the tax 
be limited to those gross receipts attributable to selling activ-
ities within the city of Los Angeles.'' 
Plaintiff's argument concerning the intent and meaning of 
the "Bradley-Burns Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law" 
enacted by the T_;egislature in 1955 [Rev. & Tax. Code, § 7200 
et seq.) does not merit discussion. We are here concerned 
with a business license tax imposed by the city of T_;os An-
geles, the applicable section of which we have heretofore held 
applied to selling activities carried on within the city, the 
tax to be measured by that portion of the gross receipts 
directly attributable to the defendant's selling activities in 
the city. ( 42 Cal.2d 823.) 
[4] Having heretofore held that only that portion of the 
gross receipts directly attributable to defendant's selling 
activities carried on in the city of Los Angeles may be taxed 
under section 21.166, and the parties having stipulated that 
by a method of allocation "fairly calculated to determine the 
defendant's gross receipts" 20 per cent thereof was derived 
from se1ling activities in the city of l.10S Angeles, we conclude 
that the trial court was correct in applying the tax formula 
to 20 per cent of defendant's gross receipts. 
Apr.1957] COLLINS v. COLLINS 
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Plaintiff's other contentions are an attempt to reargue mat-
ters concluded on the former appeal and need no discussion 
here. 
'rhe judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, .J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 24137. In Bank. Apr. 12, 1957.] 
EMILY M. COLLINS, Appellant, v. IWBERT F. COLLINS, 
Respondent. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Fraud.-Where a 
wife contemplated obtaining a divorce for some time before she 
made a property settlement agreement and obtained the 
divorce, and the husband did nothing to hinder her investiga-
tion of the character and value of the property or to cause 
her to execute the agreement precipitately, he owed her no 
duty to force her to investigate the property when she an-
nounced that she was satisfied with the agreement prepared 
by his counsel. 
[2] !d.-Transactions Inter Se-Fraud.-A husband at the time 
of divorce or separation is entitled to take a position favor-
able to his own interest in claiming as his separate property 
assets that a court might hold to be community property, and 
when confronted with the husband's assertion that certain 
assets are his separate property the wife must take her own 
position and if necessary investigate the facts. 
(3] Fraud-Reliance on Representation-Effect of Investigation.-
When one undertakes an investigation and proceeds with it 
without hindrance, it will be assumed that he continued until 
he acquired all the knowledge he desired; he cannot be heard 
to say that he relied on the representations of the other party. 
[4] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Fraud.-A hus-
band is hound in his dealings with his wife to the highest and 
best of good faith and is obligated in such dealings not to 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife,§§ 64, 77; Am.Jur., Hus-
band and Wife, § 184. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 37; Am.Jur., Fraud and 
Deceit, § 35. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6] Husband and Wife,§ 165; [3] 
Fraud,§ 28; [7] Husband and Wife,§ 157(1); [8, 10] Husband and 
Wife, § 157(10); [9, 11] Judgments, §§ 12.5, 62. 
